A Middle East Watch Report
Human Rights Watch
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Introduction 1
Mechanisms of Control 5
Scope of Controls 7
Background 10
Legal Framework 11
Cases 13
Recommendations 17
Chapter 1: Legal Framework 21
International Law-21
Domestic Law-23
Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran-23
Press Law-24
The Islamic Revolutionary Courts-26
Regulations Governing Book Publication-27
Regulations Governing Film
Production-29
Chapter 2: The Press-33
State-Affiliated Newspapers-35
Political Affiliation of National
Newspapers-35
Harassment of the Press-39
Magazines-43
Prosecution of Cartoonist Manouchehr
Karimzadeh-46
Chapter 3: Selective Application of the
Press Law 50
Prosecution of Nasser Arabba, Farad-50
Prosecution of Abbas Maroufi, Gardoon-51
Chapter 4: Foreign Media and Journalists-55
Working Conditions-55
Foreign Publications-60
Public Access to International News-61
A Banned Journalist, Kaveh Golestan-62
Chapter 5: State-Controlled Radio and
Television 65
Partial List of Clandestine Radio
Broadcasts to Iran-68
Chapter 6: Book Publishing 70
The Scope of Censorshi-71
The Censorship Process-73
Publishers and Censorship-76
Profiles of Banned Writers-78
Ali-Akbar Saidi-Sirjani-78
Moniroo Ravanipoor-80
Shahrnoush Parsipour-82
Chapter 7: The Fatwa Against Salman
Rushdie and its Extension to Iranians 85
Violent Consequences-89
Declaration of Iranians in Exile Condemning
the Fatwa-91
Chapter 8:
Film 94
The Censorship Process-98
Censored Films-99
International Film Festivals and Censored
Films-102
Two Banned Film Directors-104
Bahram Beizai-104
Mohsen Makhmalbaf-106
Chapter 9: Banned Political Expression
110
Reprisals Against Publications-111
Political Dissidents Punished-114
Chapter 10: Restricted Academic Freedom
117
Politicized Admissions-118
Vigilance and Reprisals-119
Restrictions for Women-120
Chapter 11: Denial and Distortion of
Cultural Heritage 122
Conclusion-125
Appendix A: Declaration of Iranian
Intellectuals and
Artists Condemning the Fatwa and
Signatories as
of March 1993 130
Appendix B: University Entrance
Examinations 136
Case of Maryam, Concours Examination
of 1981 136
Case of Sarah, Concours Examination
of 1982 138
Case of Leila, Concours Examinations
of 1983 and of 1984 139
Acknowledgments
The information presented in this report is
based on interviews conducted between January and July 1993 by Middle East
Watch staff and persons familiar with the events discussed. Out of concern for
their well-being, as reprisals against those who criticize the Islamic Republic
are commonplace, the names of many interviewees are not disclosed.
We wish to extend our gratitude to all the
persons whose cooperation and information made this report possible.
This report was written by Sarvenaz Bahar, an
attorney and Sophie Silberberg Fellow with Human Rights Watch. It was edited by
Human Rights Watch consultant, Cynthia Brown. Andrew Whitley, executive
director of Middle East Watch, and Gara LaMarche, executive director of the Fun
for Free Expression, offered suggestions on the text.
Linda Long, associate of Human Rights Watch,
prepared this manuscript for publication.
We are grateful for the two drawings
portrayed in this report, gifts from Iranian cartoonist and illustrator
Ardeshir Mohassess.
INTRODUCTION
Now look at the number of newspapers and
magazines that are currently being published in Iran.
What country has so many newspapers and magazines? And they write whatever they
wish.
--Supreme Religious Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
February 1993[1]
We are not apposed to the cinema, to radio,
or to television; what we appose is vice and the use of media to keep our young
people in a state of backwardness and dissipate their energies.
--Late Supreme Religious Leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
February 1979[2]
The apparent intensity of public debate,
variety of publications and the wealth of artistic achievements in the Islamic
Republic of Iran create an illusion of unrestricted discourse. But the limits
of expression are defined in complex and often arbitrary ways by a government
beset by internal power struggles and intolerance. The artistic and
intellectual community's resistance to stare-imposed censorship has produced
some relaxation of control since the early 1980s. But the parameters of what is
permitted rend to shift quickly, in response to pressures within the ruling
movement. It is never clear whether what can be said, written or filmed today
will be cause for financial ruin, arrest or other punishment tomorrow.
The large-scale purges of academics and
killings of dissidents, including writers, journalists and artists, that
characterized the years following the 1979 revolution have not continued.
Public debate has become somewhat more free and publications somewhat more
various in recent years. Many of the government's domestic and foreign policies
are criticized in newspapers, although only by fellow partisans of the ruling
movement. In some arenas, notably film, artistic achievement in the past decade
has been astounding.
Despite these improvements, however, the
limits of discourse are strictly defined, and the range of speakers in limited
to the various factions of the ruling elite. There are no independent
newspapers. Books and films are issued a release permit only after passing a
rigorous process of political vetting. The moral character of magazine editors
must be approved by the government, and every issue of a magazine must be
submitted to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance after publication.
Magazines are generally precluded from covering political issues and offering
overt social criticism. In the case of "undesirable" stories, the
magazine risks official closure, and its staff can face imprisonment and
prosecution. Journalists are generally considered a suspect group and have the
minimum of job security. They are restricted by forbidden realms of news --
until such time as that news filters in through foreign broadcasts and
publications. Artists and intellectuals run the risks of personal ruin,
censorship or banning, and detention.
Laws are applied selectively and
inconsistently, and there is uncertainty as to the governing norms. Hard-sought
government permits provide no guarantee for the continued existence and
distribution of the work approved or the protection of the artist or
intellectual involved. The criticism of influential pressure groups can become
an extrajudicial "public prosecution" of the artist or intellectual;
on the other hand, legal prosecution is often conducted in disregard of the
legal provisions and guarantees of domestic law. The accused are indicted under
broad and all-encompassing charges such as "moral corruption," "anti-revolutionary
behavior" and "siding with global arrogance."
The ineffectiveness of the legal system is
combined with an element of anarchy, which directly threatens the artistic and
intellectual community. Gangs of motorcycle riders or other vigilantes trash
magazine offices and publishing houses and threaten lives as self-proclaimed
enforcers of the law, in the name of protecting Islamic values. This they do
with the evident tolerance of the authorities, without fear of prosecution.
Vilification campaigns orchestrated by the state-affiliated press commonly
assign intellectuals and artists such labels as submissive servant of
imperialism, activist of Communism, panegyrist of the Pahlavi regime and agent
of SAVAK, the deposed Shah's secret police.
The ebbs and flows of control and censorship,
however, reflect interfactional conflicts. Forms of expression in Iran,
whether book, film or a woman's head cover, are invested with political
significance; they may signal a loosening of control and increased tolerance of
diverse views and values, or the converse. In striking at an author or film
director, political factions aim at each other in their perpetual struggle for
political power. Film director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, in a letter to the
state-affiliated press regarding its "public prosecution" of him and
his work stated:
The writer of these columns knows well that
these arguments have nothing to do with him. The fight is over nothing other
than the struggles between the different factions who seek power."[3]
Subsequent to the "public
prosecution" his work was banned.
In this report, which covers primarily the
period 1989-1993, Middle east Watch examines the various mechanisms of state
control of expression and presents more than sixty individual cases (and one
group case involving 162 persons) of Iranian writers, filmmakers, journalists
and intellectuals who have been imprisoned, prosecuted or otherwise punished
for the content of their work or whose work has been banned and censored. The
breadth of censorship goes well beyond the cases examined here; these only
serve to illustrate tactics of direct and often violent pressure by vigilante
groups, of vilification campaigns, of formal censorship, and of the power play
between different pressure groups within the ruling elite. The report's focus
in on artistic and journalistic expression, but we also include material on
some well-known cases of suppressed political expression, Also included are
general assessments of the academic environment and Iranian cultural heritage.
Our analysis of mechanisms of state control
includes nominally non-governmental pressure groups and entities, such as
foundations and newspapers. Power struggles within Iran's
ruling elite and the lack of centralized authority mean that elements as
diverse as semi-autonomous foundations led by influential clergy[4]
and state-affiliated newspapers aligned with different political factions[5]
play a pivotal role in defining how journalists, writers and artists may
express themselves on issues of personal and political importance. The
government's role in institutionalizing control and censorship ranges from the
deliberate unleashing of the more uncompromising pressure groups to taking
shelter behind a real or purported inability to counter their force and will.
The Iranians whose cases are described in
this report have little organized support in their home country, yet most of
them continue to speak out. The relaxation of censorship during Minister of
Culture and Islamic Guidance Mohammad Khatami's tenure (1989-1992) was largely
their doing, the product of their persistent and often lonely protests. Since
Khatami's resignation, however, even those small gains are newly endangered.
The marks of his more conservative successor, Ali Larijani, a former deputy
minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and close ally of Supreme
Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, are already apparent in the workings of
the Ministry and, more generally, an atmosphere of renewed restriction to which
numerous sources for this report attested. Two signs of this shift are the
cancellation of invitations issued to the organizers of Western international
film festivals to attend the Iranian Fajr Film Festival in February 1993, and
increasingly frequent, unchecked vigilante attacks against the press and
publishing houses in the past year. Another is the recent, severe crackdown on
"vice and social corruption" in Tehran,
which has included the arrests of more than 500 women in late June and ongoing
arrests through July. The women were arrested for violations of the dress code
such as wearing sunglasses; 300 men were also held for wearing short-sleeved
T-shirts.[6]
MECHANISMS OF CONTROL
Limits on freedom of expression in Iran
defy simple definition. It is not possible to trace censorship to any single
source within the government structure. Rather, there often exists no
regulation relevant to the "offense" at hand, and in a given case the
Anti-Narcotics Section of the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor, the Ministry of
Intelligence, a state-affiliated newspaper or a semi-autonomous foundation has
a much de facto power to monitor expression as the government's designated
official for this function, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.
In certain cases, censorship is accomplished
by official banning orders, or through imprisonment and mistreatment of
offenders. In most cases, the means of control are more subtle and indirect.
The government exercises control "unofficially" through binding no
official paper trail. Other forms of government control include distribution of
paper for books and newspapers, and setting prices for books and admission to
films. The financial loss associated with books banned after publication and
films banned after production also serves as an effective tool of government
retribution.
To implement its censorship policies, the
government relies on a variety of nongovernmental players. A common means of
control and censorship are unchecked vigilante attacks against the press and
publishing houses. In the 1992-1993 period alone, there have been ate least
nine such attacks in Tehran. At any
time, any piece of work may become the object of attacks orchestrated primarily
through the mass media for being anti-Islamic and anti-revolutionary,
regardless of whether the work has been previously approved by the government
and issued a permit. Crowds of angry protestors or hezbollahi[7]
may appear in the streets, vilifying the targeted individual, destroying and
looting property, deriding "lax" government policies and demanding
strict official retribution. These cords often gather at the invitation of the
state-affiliated media and generally act without meaningful police restraint or
fear of prosecution.
Some officials may object to the hezbollahis'
tactics, but blaming the victim is also common. In early June 1993, after sixty
motorcyclists attacked a magazine, a spokesman for the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance told the newspaper Salam, "We cannot stop them, but we
also do not approve of their attitude and behavior." On the other hand, he
said, "our publications should behave in a way not to offend the
sentiments of the hezbollahis."[8]
Officials who take a stronger stance in defending expression are subject to
attack themselves. For a system that lays claim to embodiment of Islamic
principles, charges that one is anti-Islamic and anti-revolutionary carry great
power. Especially in a government as divided within itself as that of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, such charges serve as an effective way of putting
state officials on the defensive. Once a politically-created javv[9]
signals a sufficient level of instability and outrage within the ruling elite,
the government responds by banning work, often previously approved, and
imprisoning and prosecuting the individuals responsible. The accusation of who
is more Islamic reverberates widely and strongly not only against the secular
but the determinedly devout.
As anarchic as the process may appear, there
is no evading censorship in Iran.
Any person can become the indirect agent of censorship, be it the book
publisher or the film producer who rejects or modifies work that may in any
fashion be controversial out of fear of unbearable financial sanctions imposed
by the government, and of prosecution. The artist or intellectual also is
caught in the grip of self-censorship, remembering colleagues who in the past
have lost their lives or liberty for their ideas, and facing everyday fear and
uncertainty. The role of self-censorship in Iran
cannot be underestimated. The hands of the government need descend on relatively
few to silence many others.
SCOPE OF CONTROLS
Expression that poses a serious threat to the
supremacy of the prevailing system -- by reaching large or crucial segments of
society or by propagating alternate systems of thought and governance -- is not
tolerated. On such matters, the government speaks with a single voice and
decisively.
Freedom to organize political parties not
aligned with the government and the freedom of such parties to express
political views are strictly and uniformly prohibited, despite the
constitutional guarantee of free association. Political speech that is
genuinely independent or critical of the government is not tolerated. Offenders
are sentenced before the Islamic Revolutionary Courts to long prison terms.
There are also a large number of political executions in Iran.[10]
The Constitution places radio and television
under the direct supervision of the religious leader and the three branches of
government. Radio and television in Iran,
a country that is forty-eight percent illiterate,[11]
exclusively promote government policy, and the content of their programs is
predominantly religious.
Educational control is also considered
crucial to the government's consolidations of power. The faculty and curricula of
all teaching institutions were purged and "Islamicized" during the
revolution's first years to ensure the ideological purity of the information
available to young people. Universities, traditional centers of dissent under
the monarchy, were closed for two years and, upon their reopening, were
reserved for students ardently committed to the values of the revolution and
the Islamic government. While ideological and character screening has abated in
recent years, especially at the undergraduate level, it remains a persistent
feature of the Iranian educational system for graduate and post-graduate
studies. Since the reopening of the universities, approximately forty percent
of student admittance has been reserved for released prisoners of war, the
revolutionary guards, paramilitary volunteers (bassiji) and the relatives of
martyrs. These students serve as the "eyes and ears" of the
government authorities and report on those teachers and fellow students
suspected of harboring anti-Islamic or anti-regime sentiments.
Denial and distortion of the Iran's
pre-Islamic cultural heritage have also been strong components of the
government's agenda Celebration of the Iranian New Year, Nowruz, or the ancient
Zoroastrian ire festival" Chahar Shanbeh Soori was impeded by the
authorities for years. This has also meant that literary giants whose work is
not in line with the prevailing value system have been wither banned outright,
de-emphasized or reinterpreted. Significant public resistance has forced the
government to abandon much of its original agenda, yet certain of its elements
persist. Parents, for example, are denied a birth certificate it they plan to
give their newborn child a name that connotes Iran's
pre-Islamic or monarchical past.
The barriers of intolerance and control are
compounded in the case of women. Women artists and intellectuals, and the
depiction of women in art, are subject artists and intellectuals, and the
depiction of women in art, are subject to severe constraints arising from
tradition and superstition. While these impulses have strong social bases, the
government has manipulated these traditions wherever possible to tighten
controls and promote its preferred value system Post-revolutionary law bars
women from a number of fields in education and educated professions such as
engineering, and severely restricts their personal freedoms. For example, after
the 1934 mandatory unveiling imposed by Reza Shah, Iranian women must once
again endure the excesses of the state, this time the mandatory veiling imposed
since the revolution.
The scope of government control and
censorship, as is well known, has extended across continents and oceans by way
of a religious edict or fatwa. Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 death sentence against
novelist Salman Rushdie and all others associated with the publication of his
book The Satanic Verses has already led to the murder of the novel's Japanese
translator and the attempted murder of its Italian translator. Since the
issuance of the fatwa, Rushdie himself has been forced to lie in hiding.
Iranians in exile who have supported Rushdie's right to expression, by openly
condemning the death sentence against him. Have been threatened with death as
well, their work has been banned in Iran
and their publishers threatened with reprisals.
Vigilance attacks and vilification campaigns
in the state-affiliated press do not stop with criticism of the work deemed
offensive or even character assassination of the artist or intellectual but
extend as well to government officials, usually those within the Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance and even occasionally the President, and call into
employees of the Ministry were prosecuted alongside writers and publishers
whose "anti-revolutionary" work they had approved.
The resignation of Mohammad Khatami, the
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, in July 1992 was brought about by
such attacks. Khatami was an outspoken opponent of lawlessness and the
influence of vigilante groups. His three-year term was a period of relative
freedom for cultural and artistic endeavors, and in response to this, he was
harshly criticized by hard-line newspapers such as Keyhan and by Supreme
Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. In his letter of resignation, submitted on
May 24, 1992, he explained
his departure by citing "the climate of insecurity that increasingly
bedevils cultural activities" in Iran,
warning that this situation threatened to condemn "intellectuals, artists
and even faithful friends of the Islamic Revolution" to
"indifference."[12]
Four periods of relative freedom of
expression in Iranian modern history were the constitutional movement of
1905-1911; the years following the abdication from power of Reza Shah in favor
of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, from 1941-1953; a period of political crisis
from 1960-1963; and the revolutionary era from March 1978 to mid-1980 Each
period ended as the ruling powers consolidated their power. Censorship and
control are deeply rooted in Iran.
Many who are censored, imprisoned and exiled today were similarly punished in
the past.
In some respects, however, the current
situation is unique. The nature of censorship in Iran
cannot be separated from the system of governance established since the
revolution of 1979 based on velayat-i faqih or the "Guardianship of the
jurisprudent."[13]
Velayat-I faqih presupposes a need for supreme guidance in the average person's
conduct of everyday affairs, and considers that the faqih is uniquely qualified
to provide such guidance, dictating the single acceptable way of life or value
system consistent with Shi'a Islam. Fundamental is the belief that every good
and pious citizen, like a child, may be steered wrong by a "perverse"
word, film or music, and thus what the citizen reads, sees and hears must be
closely monitored by the governing authorities. Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in
this regard:
If someone should ask you, "Why has God,
the All-Wise, appointed holders of authority and commanded you to obey them?
You should answer him as follows: . . . "[M]en would not be able to keep
to their ordained path and to enact God's laws unless a trustworthy and
protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility
for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit
and transgressing against the rights of others."[14]
Thus, censorship in Iran
is not only proscriptive but also prescriptive. The Iranian writer, journalist,
film director or painter is required to steer clear of sensitive topics, such
as critical and candid assessment of the system of government, sources of authority
and Islam.Additionally, however, he or she must write, direct or draw in a
manner that conforms with the prevailing value system. In fact, the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Press Law of 1985 place on
every Iranian citizen an affirmative duty to serve the prevailing Islamic value
system and promote the "public good," as construed by the government.
The process of content control on the basis
of Islamic principles, however, is complicated by the fact that Islam itself is
subject to differing interpretations, In an interview with the magazine
Cineaste, film director Abbas Kiarostami stated:
[I]n Iran,
everyone has a completely different interpretation. They're free to think what
they want. The danger comes when someone wants to say, "No. my
interpretation is the only right one."[15]
The divergent interpretations of Islam are
mirrored in the divisions within the governing elite -- especially as regards
expression.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The laws governing public discourse in Iran
provide no effective protection for dissent or even deviation. The
Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression is crippled by exceptions
requiring compliance with "the fundamental principles of Islam or the
rights of the public." The Press Law adds further debilitating exceptions.
Provisions in both instruments, apart from setting the limits of discourse,
also dictate its content: every citizen has the duty, in all aspects of his or
her life, "to enjoin the good and forbid the evil," a Koranic phrase for
the framework of the moral life. The press may not publish material that
promotes "prostitution" or "wastefulness" or "harms
the bases of the Islamic Republic." Even eligibility to start a
publication, under the Press Law, is limited to those who exhibit "moral
fitness" for that function.
The Constitutional and Press Law provisions
requiring that press offenses be tried openly and in the presence of a jury
were ignored until 1992. In that year, the two separate trials of the editors
of the magazines Farad and Gardoon were conducted in general courts and in the
presence of the press jury. The press jury consists of clergy, government
officials and editors of state- affiliated press. In one of these cases the
initial stages of prosecution, prior to trial, were marked by violations of the
Press Law and by the involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor.
Books, non-journalistic publications and
films are regulated separately. Vaguely-worded requirements in the regulations
on book publication make authors responsible for "guarding the positive
outcomes of the Islamic revolution" and forbid them from writing anything
that "profanes and denies the meanings of religion." A commission
under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance oversees the publication of
book and other printed matter. Fimmakers, on the other had, are overseen by
four councils within the Ministry -- one to review a summary of the screenplay,
one to review the full screenplay, one to review the completed film and issue
or withhold a release permit, and the fourth to review, occasionally, films
denied a release permit. Forbidden topics in film include any that "denies
or weakens the principles of Islam." "depicts foreign culture,
politics, economy or society in a misleading manner," or "presents
any material that is against the interests of the country,"[16]
In the meantime, a number of offenses related
to the press, writers and intellectuals based on the content of their work
remained unlawfully before the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Islamic
Revolutionary Courts were instituted as a temporary measure to process the
large numbers of people arrested in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. They
have since become a permanent feature of the Iranian legal system and are
notorious for their disregard of international standards of due process and for
heir harsh sentences. The government invokes the jurisdiction of the
Revolutionary Courts in offenses which, in its opinion, are not punished
severely enough by the general court -- disregarding the jurisdictional limits
of these courts under domestic law. Thus, journalists and intellectuals may be
prosecuted for the content of their work under the general rubric of acting
"against internal or external security."
CASES
This report covers more than sixty incidents
involving the prosecution, imprisonment or harassment of writers, filmmakers,
journalists and intellectuals based on the content of their work. A few cases
serve as illustrative.
The most widely known example of Iranian
censorship is Ayatollah Khomeini's issuance of a religious edict or fatwa
against a non-Iranian writer living outside Iran
in response to the content of a novel. On February 14, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini
decreed that Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses, and all
others associated with its publication were sentenced to death for apostasy and
that it was a duty after the edict, Hojatoleslam Hassan Sanei, the head of the
Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation, offered a bounty of $ 1 million to whomever
carried out the death sentence; since then, the bounty has been twice
increased, once in March 1991 to $2 million and again in February 1993 by an
unspecified amount. Meanwhile, agents of the fatwa struck on different
continents: in July 1991 both the novel's Japanese translator, Hitoshi
Igarashi, and its Italian translator, Ettore Capriolo, were stabbed by unknown
assailants -- the former fatally. Since 1989, Rushdie has lived in hiding and
under police protection. Four years later, the fatwa remains in force and has
been reiterated by leading Iranian government officials and by vote of its
parliament.
Less well known are the reprisals against
Iranians, living in exile, who have opposed the fatwa. On the third anniversary
of the edict, a group of fifty Iranian writers, intellectuals and professionals
in exile in Europe and the United
States issued a declaration condemning the
death sentence. In response, Ayatollah Janatti, a member of the council of
Guardians,[17] banned
the works of all those signatories to the declaration.
The newspaper Jumhouri-ye Islami, affiliated
with Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, announced that those Iranians
who spoke against the fatwa had joined the list of "infidels"
deserving of the death sentence. Nevertheles, by the fourth anniversary of the
edict, in February 1993, the number of signatories had increased to 162. The
government has effectively banned the works of all the current signatories.
Two of Iran's
best-known artists have been particularly outspoken critics of the Islamic
Republic's censorship and harassment policies -- of which they themselves are
targets. In the case of Ali-Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, a writer and social critic,
the government initially notified him that it had no objection to his work.
After eight of his books were published, however, the government banned their
release, thereby imposing an unbearable financial burden on him, his family and
his publishers. All his other work is now also banned.
Film director Bahram Beizai has also
suffered under government-imposed financial constraints and self-censorship. In
response to influential pressure groups, the government required extensive
modification of his most recent film, Mosaferan (Travelers) -- after having
previously censored, issued an approval permit and even given an award to the
film. He was denied the right to travel with another of his films to an
international film festival in 1992, the screening of which was approved by the
Iranian government. For thirteen years, he has been unable to work in the
theater due to the withdrawal of his work permit.
Prison, fifty lashes and the prospect of
further imprisonment are the price that cartoonist Manouchehr Karimzadeh
has paid since the April 1992 banning of the science magazine Farad, which
carried a drawing of an apparently crippled soccer player who, for some
readers, resembled the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Tried not in general court as
required for press offenses but in the Islamic Revolutionary Court, as if he
had attacked national security, Karimzadeh was sentenced to one year in prison
for having created that drawing. In blatant disregard for his rights, almost at
the end of his prison term, the Supreme Court "revoked" his sentence
and required that he be "re-tried." A trial date has yet to be
announced.
Women artists and intellectuals, and the
depiction of women in art, are subject to especially strict constraints, and
any deviation from government norms is treated with severity. Shahrnoush
Parsipour, a novelist of much acclaim, was twice imprisoned by the Islamic
Revolutionary Prosecutor for her book Zanan Bedoun-e Mardan (Women Without
Men), once with her publisher Mohammad-Reza Aslani. They were tried in
the general courts along with two officials of the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance who had reviewed and issued a permit for her book, and all
four were acquitted. Despite their acquittal, Aslani's publishing house,
Nashr-e Nogreh, was bombed by vigilantes, and Parsipoor's wok remains banned.
Another woman novelist, Moniroo
Ravanipoor, who draws her inspiration from Iranian folk tales, started
experiencing censorship with the banning of her book Sanghay Sheytan (Devil's
Stones) after vehement attacks in the press in 1990. After this banning, her
previously published work was subject to more intensive scrutiny and censorship
at subsequent printings. Her book Kanizoo was banned in 1991 at its third
printing; it was published in 1993 after twenty months of negotiated
modifications.
Historical, literary and cultural texts not
in line with the prevailing ideology are revised, reinterpreted or banned
outright. The life-long work of Ahmad Shamlu, a renowned modern poet,
has been banned on this basis. His Ketab-e Koucheh (Book of the Street) is a
compilation of 120 volumes of popular Persian sayings, slang and proverbs. The
popular lexicon in Iran
has strong secular and anti-clerical elements.
Mohsen Makmalbaf entered the film
industry after the revolution with a history of imprisonment under the Shah and
strong hezbollahi convictions. But, when his fourth and fifth films examined
the poverty and hopelessness of daily life for some Iranians, official
attitudes hardened: two of his later films were banned and a third censored.
Most recently, Makmalbaf sought the film board's approval for a script on the
1991 Gulf war, and it was rejected partly on the grounds that it had not
sufficiently focused on the plight of the Shi'a people. (Iran's
population is overwhelmingly Shi'a, as is its ruling clergy.)
The government, acutely aware of the
influence of the foreign news media, generally treats foreign journalists well
once they are allowed to enter the country. Iranian journalists working for
foreign news organizations, however, are particularly vulnerable to government,
Iranian photojournalist Kaveh Golestan prepared a video on the situation
of journalists working in Iran,
which presented an unvarnished portrait of the constraints on expression. He
lost his journalist card in June 1992 after the video was broadcast in England
and its transcript published by the free-expression group Index on Censorship.
He has also been prevented from leaving Iran.
The government has not indicated the basis for its ongoing
"investigation" of Golestan and the cancellation of his
accreditation.
Jahangir Jahanbagloo, an Iranian journalist,
had his journalist card canceled by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance in November 1992. He has been the official representative of the
American television network NBC in Iran
since 1991. Over the past nine months, the Ministry has failed to provide any
meaningful explanation for its cancellation of his accreditation. The financial
consequences to Jahanbagloo have been serious.
Upon his return to Iran
to cover a news report for a foreign television network, an Iranian freelance
cameraman, Bahram Molaie, was arrested in 1987. Without being charged or
tried for any offense, he was imprisoned for forty-five days, and his
accreditation was canceled. Long after his release from prison, in 1991, the
government informed him that there was nothing in his file, and that it was now
closed. He is still unable to work as a journalist in Iran,
however.
The Press Law, passed in 1985, was applied
for the first time in 1992 for the prosecution of two magazines editors before
the general courts and with a press jury. However, the Islamic Revolutionary
Prosecutor was unlawfully involved in the preliminary stages of one case. In
both instances, government prosecutions were initiated as a follow-up to mob
attacks against the offices of the magazines.
Nasser Arabha, editor of the science
magazine Farad, was imprisoned pending trial, then tried and sentenced to six
months imprisonment on the charge of "acting against internal
security." Farad had published a cartoon deemed by the government to be
insulting to Ayatollah Khomeini. The magazine remains banned.
The Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor,
exceeding his mandate and usurping the functions of the general courts,
indicted Abbas Maroufi, editor of the cultural magazine Gardoon, for
insulting and spreading rumors against the holy system and propagating
monarchical culture, and banned the magazine. The cover of the August 1992
issue of Gardoon was deemed anti-revolutionary. Although finally acquitted in
criminal court, Maroufi was not able to resume publication of the magazine
immediately after trial. A government representative "unofficially"
informed him that he should not publish his magazine until the javv was more
appropriate, and that the government could not be responsible for his life if
he defied the suggestion. The magazine subsequently resumed publication.
Recently, one magazine was banned and another
attacked by unchecked vigilantes on political grounds.
In April 1993, the magazine Rah-e Mojahed
published by Lotfollah Meissami was banned for printing statements by
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. At one time the designated successor to
Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri is now an opponent and critic of Supreme
Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rafsanjani.
In May 1993, the office of the scientific
magazine Kiyan was attacked by a group of motorcycle riders who called for the
closure of the magazine and the death of its editor, Reza Tehrani. At
issue was an interview the magazine had published with Mehdi Bazargan, the
former Prime Minister and head of the banned political organization
Nehzat-Azadi (Freedom Movement).
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the extent that the atmosphere for
expression in Iran has improved since the early years of the revolution, a
large measure of credit must go to the Iranians who have been determined to
continue speaking, writing, creating and thinking as they choose. Yet recent
indications are that even this small opening may be closing up again. The
Iranian government must change its policies to protect their right of free
expression, both through legal provisions that guarantee protection and through
the punishment of acts that seek to undermine that protection.
(1) To the government of Iran
Middle East Watch calls upon the Iranian
government to amend its laws so as to comply with international legal standards
on freedom of expression:
-Amend the constitution to remove those
portions that restrict the exercise of free expression (e.g. Arts. 9 and 24),
such that speech is protected consistent with international instruments to
which Iran is a
party;
-Replace the existing Press Law with
legislation whose definition of libel and registration requirements for
publications do not infringe on protected speech and freedom of opinion.
Furthermore, in order to bring state conduct
into conformity with international law, Middle East Watch calls on the
government of Iran
to:
-Abolish book and film censorship
boards;
-Cease all legal actions against newspaper
editors, journalists, writers, publishers and political activists that are
based on criticism or deviation from government policy;
-Bring about the rescission of Ayatollah
Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie and others associated with the
publication of The Satanic Verses, and the cancellation of the bounty offered
by the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation for the murder of the author.
-Bring about the rescission of the fatwa as
extended to the 162 Iranian signatories to the declaration condemning the death
sentence against Rushdie; and annul official restrictions on the presentation
and publication of their works in Iran;
-Prosecute vigilante groups that attack and
destroy property and threaten lives in cases involving the press, book
publishers and other targets chosen in reprisal for their views;
-End the use of government-distributed paper (e.g.
for books and the press) and government-set prices (e.g. for books and film) as
means of control and censorship;
-Issue all government orders and directives
officially and in writing;
-Abolish ideologically-based criteria for
admission to university.
In order to encourage free and diverse
expression, Middle East Watch calls on the government to:
- Allow non-governmental voices access to
state-owned radio and television;
-Permit the establishment of independent
radio and television stations;
-Permit the establishment and circulation of
privately-owned and -published newspapers and political magazines.
Finally, Middle East Watch urges Iran
to reverse its recent policy of denying entry to the U.N. Special
Representative, Mr. Galindo-Pohl.
2) To the European Community
Middle East Watch calls upon the European
Community to:
-Adopt a Community-wide position that
decisions regarding any EC aid and aid from individual member states to the
Iranian government -- other than that for humanitarian purposes -- will be
linked to grave abuses of the right to free expression, including the fatwa
against Salman Rushdie and those associated with The Satanic Verses and the
bounty for Rushdie's murder, and the Iranian government's arbitrary detentions
and prosecutions of journalists, writers, filmmakers and artists on the basis
of their opinions, as well as violent intimidation of such persons by groups
that operate with impunity;
-Pass a strong resolution highlighting the
overlooked plight of those Iranian artists and intellectuals whose right to
free expression inside Iran
is seriously curtailed, and of the 162 exiled Iranian writers and artists who
have publicly condemned the fatwa. The Council of Ministers should warn Iran
that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists and intellectuals living
in EC member countries will be treated as an attack on any LEC citizen; and
-Use the leverage provided by its growing
trade and investment links with Iran,
to press Iranian officials to permit a broad range of political and artistic
expression.
(3) To other trading partners of Iran
Middle East Watch urges these nations, in
particular Japan,
to:
-Use the leverage provided by their trade and
investment contacts with Iran,
to press Iranian officials to permit a broad range or political an artistic
expression; and
-Warm Iran
that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists an intellectuals living
in their national territories will be treated as an attack on a citizen of
their countries.
(4) To the United
States
Middle East Watch urges the U.S.
government to add to its already strong position on Iran
the public declaration that any attack on Iranian dissident writers, artists
and intellectuals living in the United States
will be treated as an attack on a U.S.
citizen.
CHAPTER 1
LEGAL FRANMEWORK
INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a member of the international community of
nations and as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,[18] Iran
is bound by universal norms guaranteeing freedom of expression. The Iranian
government of President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is in violation of these
norms.
Article 19 of the Covenant reads in part:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.
Violations of Article 19 must be punished by
the government "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity (Article 2(3)(a))." The government
is required to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are violated
shall have an effective remedy, which includes adopting "such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized" in the Covenant (Art. 2(2). It also provides that a
"competent judicial, administrative or legislative" authority
determine the rights of a person claiming such remedy; and that a
"competent" authority enforce such remedies when granted (Art. 2(3)).
Furthermore, Article 17 protects individuals
against unlawful attacks on their dignity and property by anyone and imposes on
the government a duty to safeguard this right. Article 17 reads:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 20 is also relevant to this report,
specifically with reference to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and all others
associated with The Satanic Verses. Article 20 states that "Any advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."[19]
Finally, the Covenant is drafted in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in recognition of
the fact that freedom from fear is inherent to the ideal of free human beings,
and that such freedom is achieved only when an individual can enjoy his or her
rights without fear of arbitrary and unlawful government interference. The
Preamble reads in part:
[T]he ideal of free human beings enjoying
civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights . . . .
DOMESTIC LAW
Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran [20]
The Iranian Constitution guarantees of
freedom of expression are subject to qualifications that effectively impede the
free exchange of information and ideas. Freedom of expression is conditional on
compliance with the government's interpretation of Islamic norms and public
interest. Article 244 reads:
Publications and the press have freedom of
expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam
or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by
law.
Furthermore, the "political, cultural,
economic, and military independence or the territorial integrity of Iran"
may not be infringed in any manner "under the pretext of exercising
freedoms" (Art. (). These provisions of the Constitution have been applied
by the government to restrict speech.
Other provisions of the Constitution intended
to protect speech have been largely ignored, such as Article 168, which states
that "political and press offenses will be tried openly and in the
presence of a jury, in courts of justice." Similarly ignored have been
Article 23, which prohibits prosecution of any person "simply for holding
a certain belief," and Article 25, which prohibits censorship unless
provided by law.
In the final analysis, the Constitution
permits control of expression by requiring that every citizen's conduct,
including speech, serve the government's notion of propriety. Article 8 imposes
on every citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran an affirmative and perpetual
duty "to enjoin the good and forbid the evil," pursuant to the
identical Koranic injunction.
In January 1992, the Head of the Judiciary
Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi announced, "Courts of justice and judiciary
branches have been notified that all press and political trials must be held in
the presence of juries and attorneys," Otherwise, he added, "the
verdicts will be nullified by the Supreme Court."[21]
Yet prosecution of some press and political offenses were subsequently
initiated and/or tried by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. Notable examples are
the prosecution of cartoonist Manouchehr Karimzadeh and the indictment and
imprisonment of novelist Shahrhoush Parsipuor and her publisher, Reza Aslani
(see Chapters 2 and 6).
Press Law[22]
The Press Law was ratified in 1985. It
applies only to publications that appear regularly with sequenced numbers (Art.
1). Novels and other books do not come under the authority of this law.
Article 2 of the Press Law expands on the
constitutional and religious duty to "enjoin the good and forbid the
evil" and contemplates a specific role and content for the press, which
consist of the following.
(A) To enlighten public opinion and to raise
the level of people's knowledge and awareness in one or more of the areas
listed in Article 1 (e.g. news, commentary, social, political, economic,
agricultural, religious, scientific, technical, military, art and sports).
(B) To promote the goals that are expressed
in the Constitution.
(C)To struggle against false and divisive
classifications and to avoid pitting different strata in society against one
another on the basis of race, language, tradition and custom . . . [sic]
(D) To fight against the manifestations of
colonial culture (e.g. prodigality, waste, vanity, luxury and spread of
prostitution) and to promote and propagate authentic Islamic culture and
diffuse virtuous principles.
(E) To protect and strengthen the policy of
"neither East, nor West,"[23]
In addition to this affirmative duty to
educate and promote particular values and ideologies, the press is prohibited
from engaging in discourse "harmful" to the principles and mandate of
Islam and public rights. Article 6 sets broadly defined restraints for the press,
which forbid publishing material that promotes "prostitution" or
"wastefulness;" "creates divisions among the different strata of
society," in particular on the grounds of racial or tribal affiliation;
"harms the bases of the Islamic Republic;" or threatens the "security,
integrity and interests of the" state. These prohibitions are subject to
much manipulation and arbitrary use by government officials.
Contradicting all the restraints noted above,
Article 4 of the Press Law categorically forbids all censorship and control of
the apres. It reads: "No official or unofficial authority has the right to
expert pressure on the press for the publication of any material or article, or
attempt to censor or control the press." However, the terms of this
provision have not been honored.
The Press Law requires that press offenses be
prosecuted before a jury in the courts of general jurisdiction (Art. 34). Every
two years, a council composed of the head of the judiciary, head of the city
council or alternatively the mayor, and a representative from the Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance meets to select the press jury.[24]
The council selects fourteen people "who are trusted by the public"
from a variety of social groups including: "clergy, university professors,
medical doctors, writers, journalists, lawyers, teachers, heads of notary
offices, guilds, tradesmen, workers and farmers." Seven serve as the
original jury, while seven are on reserve. Members of the press jury must meet
three prerequisites. They must: be at least thirty years of age, have no
criminal record, and be "known for trustworthiness and sincerity and have
good reputation."
After completion of deliberations and closure
of case, the press jury must decide two questions: (a) Is the accused guilty? And
(b) In the case of a finding of guilt, does the criminal deserve a reduced
sentence?
The vote of the majority of the jury members
is submitted in writing to the court. The court reaches a decision based on the
jury's findings. If the jury has found the accused guilty, application of the
law and determination of the punishment are the sole prerogatives of the court.
Press matters are monitored by a five-member
council in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Art. 36).[25]
The council, either on its own initiative or that of the Ministry, looks into
allegations of press offenses (Art. 12), and if legal action is deemed
necessary, the council is required to submit a written statement requesting
prosecution to the "court of competent jurisdiction" (Art. 12).
Despite these provisions, in practice other
government agencies, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor; have
maintained control over the monitoring and prosecution of press offenses.
The Islamic Revolutionary Courts
At the instigation of Ayatollah Khomeini, the
Revolutionary Council[26]established
the Islamic Revolutionary Courts on June
17, 1979, as a temporary measure to process the large numbers of
people arrested in the aftermath of the revolution. The Courts have settled
into permanence, however. Their jurisdiction, as amended in 1983, encompasses:
Any offence against internal or external
security, attempt on the life of political personalities, any offence relating
to narcotic drugs and smuggling, murder, massacre, imprisonment and torture in
an attempt to fortify the Pahlavi regime,[27]
suppressing the struggles of the Iranian people by giving orders or acting as
agent, plundering the public treasury, profiteering and forestalling the market
of public commodities.[28]
The government invokes the jurisdiction of
the Revolutionary Courts in offenses, including those relating to journalists,
writers and intellectuals, which in its opinion are not punished severely
enough by the general courts. The Islamic Revolutionary Courts have been widely
criticized for their disregard for due process and harsh sentences. Trials in
the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are routinely held behind closed doors,
without assistance of counsel or the right to present witnesses, and without
the right to appeal.[29]
Regulations Governing Book Publication
Book publication is governed by regulations
issued by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance which were ratified in
1988.[30]
Books and publications must serve a particular objective in the Islamic
Republic. Article 3(A)(5) of the regulations outlines these objectives, which
include "encouraging" the following:
(a) Strengthening and expanding research, as
a principle means of gaining cultural independence and increasing the public's
knowledge and ability to choose.
(b) Reasonable and knowledgeable defense of
political, economic, and cultural independence, especially in favor of the
principle "neither East, nor West."
(c) Guarding the positive outcomes of the
Islamic revolution, and struggling to strengthen and expand these outcomes.
(d) Introducing the Islamic revolution
through the compilation and publication of valuable scientific and cultural
works.
Article 3(B) of the regulations indicates
which books or publications are damaging to the principles of Islam and the
right of the public and thus are not worthy of publication. It prohibits all
material which:
(1) ... [P]rofanes and denies the meanings of
religion.
(2) Propagates prostitution and moral
corruption.
(3) Incites the public to an uprising against
and opposition to the order of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(4) Propagates the objectives of destructive
and unlawful groups and strayed sects, and defends monarchic and dictatorial
regimes.
(5) Creates unrest and conflict between
tribes and religious groups, and injures the unity of society and the
territorial integrity of the country.
(6) Insults or weakens national pride and
patriotism, and creates loss of self-confidence before the culture,
civilization and imperialistic regimes of the West or East.
(7) Propagates dependence on a global power
and objects to the line of thinking based on preserving the independence of the
country.
Article 4 of the regulations requires that
the Ministry set up a commission to oversee compliance of book publications
with Article 24 of the Constitution. The Ministry must select at least five
persons for the commission. These persons must be "knowledgeable persons
or persons in the science or culture fields familiar with issues pertaining to
books, publication and social, political and propaganda affairs."
Chapter 6 describes in detail the censorship
process for the publication o books.
Regulations Governing Film Production
Film production is governed by regulations
issued by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which were ratified in
1989.[31]
Four councils within the Ministry are
involved in the supervision, production and censorship of film:
Shoray-e Sodoor Parvaneh Filmsazi (Council
for Issuing a Production Permit) -- This council inspects the full text of the
screenplay and determines whether it can be produced. It is composed of five
persons knowledgeable in matters pertaining to film and cinema, selected by the
Bureau for Supervision and Evaluation and the undersecretary of the Ministry's
film division, and approved by the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.
They include: a "filmmaking expert"; "production and management
expert"; and expert familiar with cultural and artistic affairs"; and
a representative from the Bureau for Supervision and Evaluation.
Shoray-e Bazbini (Council of Film Reviewing)
-- This council reviews the completed film and determines whether it should be
issued a release permit. It consists of the following five persons: "a
cleric familiar with artistic matters"; "three persons with
political, social and Islamic awareness and familiarity with film and
cinema"; and "an expert in film matters and domestic and foreign
cinema." A persona from the Bureau for Supervision and Evaluation is
present in the council's deliberations and is given the right to vote only when
he or she serves as a substitute for an absent member of the council.
Shoray-e Ali-e Nezarat (High Council of
Deputies) -- This council in certain circumstances reviews films which have not
been issued a permit by the Council of Film Reviewing. It consists of a senior
representative of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; the
undersecretary of the Ministry's film division; the undersecretary of the
Ministry's cultural division; the undersecretary of the Ministry's artistic
division; and a senior official from the Baureau for Supervision and
Evaluation.
In March 1993, the government publicly
released regulations governing film content that we excerpt below. (A more
limited roster of content restrictions had been made public in recent years and
the Ministry's technical regulations -- governing the steps to be taken for
film approval -- have been in foci for a decade.) These regulations[32]
prohibit all material which:
-Denies or weakens the principles of Islam.
-Subverts Islam by propagating superstition
and sorcery.
-Insults directly or indirectly God's
messengers, vali-ye faqih, the Leadership Council or qualified mojtaheds [those
learned in Islamic law].
-Profanes the sanctities of Islam and of
other religions recognized in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
-Denies humankind's equality on the basis of
color, race, language or ethnicity, negates the supremacy of virtue over all
other considerations, and aggravates racial and ethnic differences.
-Denies or weakens the highest qualities of
humankind (the veil, the spirit of forgiveness, sacrifice, modesty and . . .).
[sic]
-Depicts or mentions situations that are
against Islamic virtue (slander, use of tobacco products . . .). [sic]
-Propagates vile acts, corruption,
prostitution and improper wearing of the veil.
-Educates on the topic of or encourages
dangerous and injurious addictions and illicit professions such as smuggling.
-Depicts foreign culture, politics, economy
or society in a misleading manner.
-States or presents any material that is against
the interests of the country and can be exploited by foreigners.
-Depicts scenes of murder, torture and
inhumane treatment in a manner that could cause viewers grief or miseducate
them.
-Expresses or depicts historic and geographic
facts and the internal problems of the country in an exaggerated way or in a
manner that misleads the viewer and offends the principles of Islam.
-Depicts unpleasant sounds or scenes
(including those caused by technical defects) that could jeopardize the
viewer's health.
-Involves films with low artistic or
technical value that could lead to a decline in the public's taste and
sensibilities.
Even after securing the necessary permits for
production and release of a film, the regulations allow the undersecretary of
the Ministry's film division to postpone the screening of a film in response to
the necessities of political and cultural circumstances.
Chapter 8 describes in detail the role of the
councils and the censorship process for the production of film.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRESS
The number of publications in Iran
has fluctuated significantly since the revolution. At the present time, it has
once again risen to relatively high levels: in early 1993, the France-based
organization Reporters Sans Frontieres estimated that there were 560
publications nationwide, including thirty-three dailies, 105 weeklies, 221
monthly and twenty-five bi-monthly publications. But these bare numbers
misrepresent the narrow range of tolerated discourse and the strict mechanisms
of control. The current state of the press also provides a stark contrast to
the wide diversity of opinion that was expressed in publications during the
revolutionary period.
By the middle of 1979, it is estimated that
more than 260 government- or privately-owned papers were being published in Iran,
almost twice the number published prior to the revolution.[33]
In the period known as the "Spring of Freedom," from March 1978 to
mid-1980, many previously banned or underground publications were sold and
distributed openly. Public debate and criticism centered on the possible and
emerging forms of governance. Soon after consolidating its power, however, the
ruling elite that emerged from the revolutionary struggles set about
restricting newly-gained freedoms. As part of a progressive tightening of
control, in a famous speech in November 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini asked the
government: "Why do you not stop these newspapers? Why do you not shut
their mouths? Why do you not stop their pens?"[34]
The governmental onslaught against the press
started within months of the February 1979 revolution, as religious groups
loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini took over the major Tehran
daily newspapers Keyhan and Ettela'at. It intensified in August 1979 with the
Revolutionary Council's passage of a new press law, which was intended to bring
the media under government control. The 1979 Press Law required that all
existing publications obtain a license within three months; many publications
closed as a result. This onslaught culminated in June 1981 with a state of
siege against all political opposition organizations and the closure of their
publications. During this period, the owners and staff of newspapers,
publishing houses and bookstores were targets of imprisonment, and executions
were common. For a time, the press struggled to survive and maintain its
independence in the face of increasing restrictions and mob attacks, but to no
avail.
A more comprehensive press law was approved
by the Majlis after lengthy deliberations in January 1985, setting out
operating guidelines for newspapers and magazines. Unlike books and films,
which must be issued a permit prior to their release, newspapers and magazines
are controlled primarily through mechanisms that are triggered once they have
been published be submitted automatically to the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance. Printed opinion or reportage that exceeds the narrow limits
of acceptable discourse may lead to retaliation including unchecked mob
attacks, the suspension or closure of publishing facilities, and the prosecution
and imprisonment of those responsible. Integral to the government's control of
the press is the self-censorship bred by writer's and editor's fear of such
retribution.
The government's failure or refusal to renew
permits also serves as a retributive mechanism. Article 8 of the Press Law
requires that print media obtain a permit from the Ministry before commencing
publication. Article 7(A) prohibits the printing of publications which do not
have permits, or those whose permits have been invalidated or cancelled
temporarily or permanently, by court order. The Ministry's five-member press
council[35]
is required to specify the reasons for its rejection of a publication request,
notifying the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance of its decision within
three months (Arts. 11 an 13). Two months after the acceptance of a request,
the Ministry must issue a publication permit, and the publication must appear
within the following six months (Arts. 13 and 16).
The Press Law severely restricts eligibility to
start a publication. The right to publish newspapers and magazines is limited
to those Iranian citizens who exhibit what the government considers to be moral
fitness (Art. 9(4)). Those who held official positions between 1963 and 1978,
those associated with the Shah's regime, and those who supported that regime
are explicitly precluded from publishing newspapers or magazines (Art. 9).
Iranian journalists also are required to obtain accreditation from the Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance.
The following section assesses the political
affiliation of national newspapers. It then describes instances of government
prosecution of newspaper and magazine staff, and of unchecked mob violence
against the press. The section concludes with the case of Manouchehr
Karimzadeh, prosecuted for a cartoon appearing in Farad magazine
STATE-AFFILIATED NEWSPAPERS
Political Affiliation of National
Newspapers
All newspapers derive their funding from and
serve as mouthpieces for the government, semi-autonomous foundations or
influential clergy. There exist no truly independent newspapers in Iran.[36]
Newspapers nevertheless reflect widely divergent views on governance and
policy, within the restricted paradigm of an Islamic government. Their pages
often serve as the prime battleground for ideological debate, factional
conflict and character assassination. An editiorial in the pro-Rafsanjani Tehran
Times of July 1992 stated:
Most newspapers were afflicted with
self-censorship or with a kind of party and group vengeance because, after the
victory of the revolution, officials in charge of the country's important
newspapers were mainly comprised of two parts: those who desired to use the
newspapers as a ladder of success to reach higher state posts or those who left
posts as ministers and top officials and fell in status and turned to the press
to be present in the country's politico-economic scene.[37]
There are twelve national daily newspapers
currently published in Iran,
including two in English. A listing of daily newspapers follows with a profile
of each one's affiliation; the first two newspapers, Keyhan and Ettela'at, are
government-owned. The remaining newspapers are state-affiliated:
-Keyhan[38]
(Galaxy) -- This paper is the continuation of one of the best known
pre-revolutionary dailies after its property was expropriated by the
state-owned Bonyad-e Mostazafin (Foundation of the Dispossessed) and its staff
purged in 1979. Its subsidiary, Keyhan-e Hava'i, is published and distributed
abroad in Persian with several pages in English. It is aligned with the
hezbollahi faction, and its editor-in-chief is directly appointed by the
Supreme Religious Leader.
-Ettela'at (Information) -- This paper is
also the continuation of one of the most known pre-revolutionary daily, after
its property was expropriated by the state-owned Bonyad-e Mostazafin
(Foundation of the Dispossessed) and its staff purged in 1979. It follows a
conservative pro-clergy line often sympathetic to President Rafsanjani and with
considerable following inside the Majlis. Its editor-in-chief is directly
appointed by the Supreme Religious Leader.
-Keyhan International (English-language) --
This is the daily English subsidiary of Keyhan published in Iran.
-Jomhouri-ye Islami (Islamic Republic) -- It
was institued by the now defunct Islamic Republic Party in 1979, and, is
presently associated with Supreme Religious Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It
is firmly in favor of a theocratic state dominated by clergymen and against
Western ties.
-Salam (Hello) -- This paper started publishing
in October 1990 and is associated with the group of clergy who broke off from
the governing elite and formed the Majma'-e Rowhaniyun-e Mobarez-e Tehran
(Tehran Combatant Clergy Association) (the breakaway group).[39] The
manager and licensed publisher of the paper is Hojatoleslam Mohammad
Musavi-Kho'iniha. It strictly follows the line of the late Ayatollah Khomeini
and is critical of the economic, cultural and foreign policies of President
Rafsanjani.
-Jahan-e Islam (World of Islam) -- This paper
was instituted in 1991 and is headed by Hadi Khamenei, the brother of Supreme
Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. It also strictly follows the line of the
late Ayatollah Khomeini and is critical of the President's policies. It is
similar to Salam in political ideology.
-Kar-va Kargar (Work and the Worker) -- This
paper is published by Khaney-e Kargar (House of Workers), a workers' syndicate
with strong religious and state affiliations, that voices workers' grievances
with employers. Hossein Kamali, a member of parliament, heads the House of
Workers. It was initially set up by the leftists after the revolution, and was
later taken over by religious elements. It is sympathetic to the policies of
the Tehran Combatant Clergy Association (breakaway group).
-Tehran Time (English-language) -- This
paper, the continuation of a pre-revolutionary daily, is known to be associated
with the policies of President Rafsanjani and the Foreign Ministry. It is
published by the semi-autonomous foundation the Islamic Propagation
Organization headed by Hojatoleslam Ahmad Jannati.[40]
-Abrar (Rightly Guided) -- This paper
replaced the newspaper Azadegan (Liberated) after the government ordered it
closed in 1985 for criticizing members of the Majlis. Azadegan, in the early
revolutionary period, in turn had taken over the confiscated printing presses
and premises of the left-wing newspaper Ayandegan (Futurists). It is published
by Ghafur Garshassbi and is believed to be aligned with the Tehran Combatant
Clergy Association (the breakaway group).
-Resalat (Prophetic Mission) -- This paper
has been published since 1986. It follows a conservative pro-clergy line,
sympathetic with President Rafsanjani's liberal economic policies but critical
of his relatively liberal stance on social and cultural developments. It is
owned by Hojatoleslam Ahmad Azari-Qomi, a prominent member of the Majlis.
-Hamshahri (Citizen) -- This paper is the
latest addition to the list of daily newspapers and is distinguished by its use
of color. It was launched by the mayor of Tehran,
Gholam Hossain Karbaschi, in December 1992. It seems to voice the opinions of
the more moderate factions within the political sphere.
In addition, there is one daily newspaper
published in the provinces, Khorasam, which is distributed at a national level.
There are no dependable estimates of the
daily circulation of individual papers. Keyhan is believed to be in the lead,
followed by Ettela'at, both of them with circulations in the range of 100,000
to 300,000. But it is unclear how many of these two papers are actually read,
since copies are distributed free to government offices. The remaining Persian
daily newspapers claim a circulation of 20,000 to 40,000. The two English
dailies have an estimated circulation of 5,000.
In a recent report, the combined circulat
