Ya'qub Mehrnahad: One Person’s Story

Human rights violations in this case

The Courts

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 11 February 1979-1994

In the immediate aftermath of the 11 February 1979 Revolution, an ad hoc tribunal, initially referred to as the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tribunal, was set up to try the officials of the previous regime, for which no specific procedures were devised. In a decree dated 24 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolutionary religious leader, appointed a cleric as Shari’a Judge and instructed him “to issue Shari’a-based rulings,” thereby establishing the foundation of a system of special courts.

Initially, the revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction was determined by the religious judge’s interpretation of the Shari’a (Islamic law based on the teachings of the Qur’an, the traditions of the Prophet, the 12 imams, and the teachings of Shi’a scholars. On 17 June 1979, the Revolutionary Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office Rules of Procedure, which was only selectively observed, established the latter’s jurisdiction and make-up.

The Courts’ jurisdiction encompassed a wide array of offenses including moharebeh (“waging war with God”), efsad e fel arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”), crimes against national and international security, economic crimes, murder, profiteering, prostitution, rape, and narcotic drugs-related crimes. The law required that two of the three principal members of the Revolutionary Courts be Shari’a judges.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 1994-2002

With the adoption of the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994, and the Code of Criminal Procedure for General and Revolutionary Courts of 19 September 1999, a uniform code of procedure was applied to both revolutionary and general courts. The jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts was limited to 6 categories of offenses:

1. Crimes against national and international security,“moharebeh” (enmity with god) and “efsad e fel arz” (corruption on earth;)

2. defaming Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Leader;

3. plotting against the Islamic Republic of Iran, armed action, terrorism, and sabotage;

4. espionage;

5. smuggling and drug-related crimes; 6. claims under Principle 49 (economic crimes) of the Constitution.

6. Furthermore, pursuant to the Law on the Manner of Punishing Individuals Engaged in Unauthorized Audio and Visual Activities, Article 11, the revolutionary courts have jurisdiction over crimes that fall within the purview of said Law, including production and distribution of obscene materials and misuse and abuse thereof.

These courts continued, however, to try cases falling outside their jurisdiction, such as theft and sexual offenses. Further, the vagueness of laws regarding national security allowed the revolutionary courts to try political and media crimes whenever they wished to do so.

The new law eliminated the Prosecutor’s Office and gave the judges inthe Revolutionary Courts the power to perform the duties of the prosecutor, as well as their own, in any case brought before them.

Islamic Revolutionary Courts, 2002-Present

The Amended Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 2002 reinstated the Prosecutor’s Office in both revolutionary and general courts. In cases involving political and media crimes, revolutionary courts’ jurisdiction overlaps with that of Province Criminal Courts.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014, and its coming into force in June 2015, the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts remains unchanged, with slight modifications in procedural aspects of adjudication. For instance, the new law provides that for crimes subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, or higher, the revolutionary court shall convene with three judges, whereas, prior to the passage of this law, adjudication of all crimes within the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts took place with only a single judge.

The Appellate System of Revolutionary Courts, 1979-Present

From their inception until 1994, the rulings of the Revolutionary Courts were not subject to appeal. In the early 1980s a court entitled the Supreme Court of Qom was established in the city of Qom and which reviewed cases of execution and confiscation of properties, thereby forming a first tier form of appeal. The exact date of the creation of the court is not clear, but, based on available information, the court became operational in the early 1980s, even though Ayatollah Khomeini's official order for its creation is dated 1985. The court’s procedure was not systematic and did not meet the international standards for a court of appeals; there was no official record of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Qom was dissolved in 1989.

The Law of 14 June 1994 subjected the Courts’ decisions to appeal. An appellate court was established at each provincial capital, called the Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by the Revolutionary Courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those involving capital punishment.

Narcotic drugs-related crimes constitute a significant exception to the appeals process. Governed by the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of 1988, as Amended on 8 November 1997 and 31 July 3 2010, these crimes are within the jurisdiction of, and are adjudicated on a regular basis by, Revolutionary Courts whose decisions are final. After being handed down by the judge, death sentences are sent to the Prosecutor General or the Head of the Supreme Court as a matter of administrative approval.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 (and its coming into force in June 2015), however, drug related crimes became subject to appeal as well.

General Courts, 1979-1982

In cases not falling under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, the system devised under the previous regime continued to function in parallel with new systems devised by laws passed by the Judicial Council, one of which, entitled The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, radically changed the entire structure and categorization of the courts. It divided the courts in three branches: Criminal, Civil, and Peace (a sort of arbitration court dealing with minor financial and other disputes). Specialized courts such as family courts were eliminated.

General Courts, 1982-1994

The Law of the Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1982 established a new criminal courts system, Criminal Courts I and II. Criminal Court I, established only in provincial capitals, had jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Criminal Court II heard less serious crimes.

General Courts, 1994-2002

The Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 14 June 1994 established umbrella courts called General Courts, which replaced and dissolved pre-existing civil and criminal courts. The law dissolved the Prosecutor’s offices and tasked a single person with the roles of judge, prosecutor, and investigator.

General Courts, 2002-2015

In 2002, the 1994 Law was amended, reviving the role of the Prosecutor’s Office in General Courts. The prosecution offices were re-established in a gradual process over several years. The amended law also re-established specialized branches within general courts dealing separately with criminal and civil matters. In addition, this law allocated a number of branches of the Province Court of Appeals to have original jurisdiction over a number of cases including the most serious offenses, as well as political and media crimes. In these cases, the branches are called the Province Criminal Court.

General Courts, 2015 to Today

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, general courts underwent certain changes as well. Criminal courts were divided into Criminal Court One, Criminal Court Two, Military Court, Juvenile Court, and Revolutionary Court. Criminal Court One has jurisdiction over serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, life imprisonment, amputation, third degree, and higher, as well as political and media crimes. Criminal Court Two has jurisdiction over other crimes. Another change consists of the establishment of juvenile courts, which adjudicates crimes committed by individuals less than 18 years of age. In cases where the individuals less than 18 commit serious crimes such as those subject to the death penalty, however, Criminal Court One will have jurisdiction, observing rules of juvenile criminal procedure.

The Appellate System of General Courts, 1979-Present

The Legal Bill for the Establishment of General Courts of 11 September 1979, abolished appeal of most criminal courts’ decisions. The law of 1982 restricted the appeal possibility even further. According to the Islamic Republic authorities’ interpretation of Islamic Law, a qualified jurist’s decisions were not subject to appeal except under special circumstances, such as when the judge realized his own mistake, or another judge advised him so, or when he did not have jurisdiction over the case. Even in such situations, the case would not go to a higher court but would be subject to review by the same judge or another judge at his level. The judges were even urged to call their verdicts “opinions,” so that the possible change in the verdict would not be “haram” (“sinful,” the highest level of prohibition in Islam, disobedience of which would result in a sin).

In October 1988, the Majles (Iranian parliament) passed a law regarding review of court judgments. This law provided for an appeal if the conviction was claimed to be based on invalid documentation or false testimony. The defendant could also base an appeal on a point of law or a procedural violation.

The appellate system was expanded in other laws in the late 1980s and in 1993. The Law for the Establishment of Criminal Courts I and II of 11 July 1989 created the Branches of the Supreme Court. Crimes of less importance, tried in Criminal Court II, were subject to review by Criminal Court I.

For the most important crimes involving death punishment, which were under the jurisdiction of Criminal Court I, the law allowed limited appeal to the Branches of the Supreme Court. Defendants had the right to petition the Supreme Court for appeal in certain cases involving false testimony or procedural violations, and if granted, the case would be remanded to either another criminal court or the original one.

Finally, the Law for the Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts of 1994, as amended in 2002, established an appellate court at each provincial capital, called Province Court of Appeals, composed of a three-judge panel, to review decisions made by both general and revolutionary courts. The Supreme Court was designated as the appellate authority for particular decisions, including those carrying the death penalty, as well as decisions made by the Province Criminal Court.

The amended law of 2002, continued the appellate procedure to the Branches of the Supreme Court established by the afore-mentioned law of 11 July 1989

The Supreme Court continues to be the competent authority to rule on new trials, which have been provided for in limited circumstances.

With the passage of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2014 and its coming into force in June 2015, the Court of Appeals shall be the competent authority to hear appeals from Criminal Court Two decisions, and the Supreme Court shall hear appeals from Criminal Court One decisions.

Special Courts for the Clergy

These courts are rooted in a 1979 decree, issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which established a committee of religious and noble figures in every region to purge the clergy of anti-revolutionary elements under the supervision of the Revolutionary Courts. Between late 1981 and 1984, a special court in the city of Qom handled, though not systematically, the trial of clerics.

On 29 July 1987, Ayatollah Khomeini officially appointed a prosecutor and a member of the clergy as Shari’a judge for Special Courts for the Clergy. On 6 August 1990, a directive was issued regulating the conduct of these courts, the jurisdictional ambiguity of which is such that it effectively extends to “anyone where one of the parties is a cleric” and to “all matters in which the Court is designated as competent by the Supreme Leader.”

The court, which was not mentioned in the Islamic Republic's constitution, was mandated to try “pseudo clerics, those related to/connected with the clergy, for public and/or anti-revolutionary crimes, and violations of the prestige of the clergy,” and where the principal suspect is a member of the clergy, “any co-conspirator or assistant, whether a cleric or not.”

These courts are generally not open to the public and can issue sentences for all acts and omissions punishable under codified Iranian laws or Shari’a or for any other acts or omissions which can bring dishonor to the clergy or to the Islamic Revolution. Further, in certain particular cases – which have not been defined – where no punishment has been devised by either the Penal Code or even the Shari’a, the Court “can rule as it deems fit.”

The Appellate System of the Special Court for the Clergy, 1979-Present

There is no information on any appeal process for the Special Court for the Clergy prior to the 1990 directive. Article 49 of said directive set up, however, an appeals court called Special Appellate Court for the Clergy, the head of which is appointed by the Supreme Leader, to which the decisions of the lower court can be appealed.

Military Courts

The military court system, independent from the judiciary under the previous regime, became a part of it on 1 December 1981. The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces, established in 1986, replaced and merged other military courts and tribunals in existence at the time, namely the pre-revolution Judiciary Organization of the Army, the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army (established on 8 December 1979), and the Revolutionary and General Court for the Revolutionary Guards (established on 15 July 1979.) The Judiciary Organization of the Armed Forces has its own Criminal Code and follows the country’s general rules of criminal procedure.

The Law of the Criminal Procedure of the Armed Forces of 15 May 1985 created Military Courts I and II. Military Court I has jurisdiction over more serious offenses, including those punishable by death, and Military Court II hears less serious crimes.

The Appellate System of Military Courts, 1979-Present

The law of 8 December 1979, establishing the Revolutionary Military Court, did not provide for any appeals. The Law of 15 May 1985 created a system of appeals through the creation of a two-tier system of courts. The decisions of Military Court II were subject to review by Military Court I. This law also provided that multiple Branches of the Supreme Court be designated as the appellate court to review decisions of Military Court I.

The judges

1979-1997: Prosecutors and judges are not necessarily law graduates and jurists. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, a five-member Committee was established to purge the judicial system of undesirable elements, pursuant to the Legal Bill for the Modification of the Judiciary and the Law for Hiring Judges of 8 March 1979. The power of the committee was absolute and its decisions, resulting in a widespread purge of the judiciary, final.

The Law for the Conditions of Selection of Judges of 4 May 1981 established the conditions of eligibility for judges. The latter were to be hired among men who were legitimate children and had practical commitment to Islam and allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The law, which led to the hiring of clerics and Islamic legal scholars, also allowed hiring practically anyone as a judge who could “obtain the Judicial High Council’s permission.” Moreover, Note 2 of the Amendments of 4 October 1982 to this law allowed widespread employment of seminary students “who ha[d] general knowledge equivalent to a high school diploma” as judges at prosecutor’s offices in general as well as Revolutionary Courts.

By 1989, the judiciary counted about 2,000 new judges trained in theological seminaries (graduates and students) and political appointees, many having replaced judges trained in law schools.

1997-Present: As of this writing (2013) the Law for Hiring Judges and its amendments of 4 October 1982, 7 February 1987, and 9 May 1988 are in full force and form the basis for hiring judges. The Executive Rules of Procedure of 22 December 1997 subjected such hiring to passing an entrance examination and successful completion of an apprenticeship program, the duration of which ranges between one and two years. The law does not limit hiring to men only but does not specify in what capacity women will be functioning, other than an advisory one.

Currently, judges are selected in accordance with the Guidelines on the Recruitment, Selection, and Internship for Judicial Candidates and the Hiring of Judges.

Dismissal of Judges: From 1979 to 1989, the judiciary was run by the Supreme Judicial Council which was composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General (both of whom were appointed by the Supreme Leader), and three judges elected by the entire body of judges in the country. The Council had the power to hire and dismiss judges in accordance with the law.

The constitutional reforms of 1989 substituted the Supreme Judicial Council with one person, the Head of the Judiciary. The Supreme Leader, whose mandate is not subject to popular vote, appoints the Head of the Judiciary for a 5-year term. The latter has significant power to influence the dismissal of judges. Dismissal cases are referred to three types of disciplinary courts, presided over by judges appointed by the Head of the Judiciary, who has veto power over any decisions made by the relevant courts.

Two of these courts, established in 1991 and 2011, are charged with examining the judges’ conduct from a religious and ideological standpoint. The process does not necessarily involve the defendant and the final decision, left to the Head of the Judiciary, is not subject to appeal.

Human rights violations

Based on the available information, some or all of the following human rights may have been violated in this case:

The right to liberty and security of the person. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 9.1.
The right not to be punished for any crime on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed.

UDHR, Article 11.2; ICCPR, Article 15, Article 6.2.
The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 18.1, ICCPR, Article 18.2; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 1 and Article 6.

In its general comment 22 (48) of 20 July 1993, the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee observed that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entailed the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert.
The right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.

UDHR, Article 19; ICCPR, Article 19.1 and ICCPR, Article 19.2.
The right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade union for the protection of one’s interests.

UDHR, Article 20; ICCPR, Article 22.1.
The right, as a member of a religious or ethnic minority, to enjoy one’s own culture or to profess and practice one’s own religion.

UDHR, Article 18; ICCPR, Article 27.

The right to due process

The right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a competent and impartial tribunal in accordance with law.

UDHR, Article 11.1; ICCPR, Article 14.1 and Article 14.2.

Pre-trial detention rights

The right to know promptly and in detail the nature and cause of the charges against one.

UDHR, Article 9(2); ICCPR, Article 9.2 and Article 14.3.a
The right to counsel of one’s own choosing or legal aid and the right to meet with one’s attorney in confidence

ICCPR, Article 14.3.d; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 1 , Article 2, Article 5, Article 6, and Article 8.
The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense case.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.b; Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Article 8
The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess to guilt.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.g.
The right not to be subjected to torture and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

UDHR, Article 5; ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1, and Article 2.

Trial rights

The right to a fair and public trial without undue delay.

ICCPR, Article 9.3, Article 14.1, Article 14.3.c.
The right to examine, or have examined the witnesses against one and to obtain the attendance and examination of defense witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses for the prosecution.

ICCPR, Article 14.3.e.

The right to have the decision rendered in public.

ICCPR, Article 14.1.

Capital punishment

The inherent right to life, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6.1; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Article 1.1, Article 1.2.
The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Article 1 and Article 2.

About this Case

The execution of Mr. Ya’qub Mehrnahad was announced on August 4, 2008 on the website of Human Rights Activists in Iran and the Iranian Students News Agency of Sistan and Baluchestan province. Additional information has been drawn from his own weblog (mehrnehad.blogfa.com), Amnesty International reports (Feb. 12 and Mar. 12, 2008), the Amirkabir University (Tehran Polytechnic) Students’ Forum News (AUTNEWS Feb. 11, Feb. 20, Aug. 5, 2008), Radio Balooch website (Sweden, Feb. 9, 2008) and Norooz News (Aug. 6, 2008).

Mr. Merhnahad, a 28-year old father of three and an ethnic Baluch, was a journalist and a civil society activist. He was the head of the Voice of Justice Young People’s Society, an organization founded in 2002 and registered by the National Youth Organization (a state agency). The Society’s mandate includes education and assistance to the disadvantaged. It provides courses and professional training. It also focuses on discrimination issues and accountability.

The Organization holds an annual meeting called “Questioning Youth, Accountable Authorities” in April/May during which social problems are discussed with local authorities. Members of the Central Council of the Society are elected every year by the Society’s members. Mr. Mehrnahad was elected the executive director of the Society for three consecutive terms. He was also a journalist and editor-in-chief of the Mardomsalary [Democracy] newspaper (AUTNEWS, Feb. 11, 2008).

Mr. Mehrnahad’s stated goal was to eliminate what he believed to be the root causes of violence, which characterizes his region. He called for social justice, accessible education, and end to discrimination. He rejected violence and promoted activism within the legal framework. He believed that “the only way to provide security is through justice, eradication of poverty and discrimination and unemployment” (his blog, Feb 28, 2007). Therefore, in 2006, he attempted to run for the City Council in Zahedan but his candidacy was rejected (his blog, Dec. 9, 2006). Mr. Mehrnahad, who attributed the authorities’ rejection to his campaign for human rights and transparency, did not give up promoting rights and non-violence:

“I believe that the right to freedom of expression and freedom of thought and defending human rights while respecting other people’s rights and dignity and while maintaining security and public order are my religious and legal duties … Some expected that by rejecting [my] candidacy, they would attract young people into the arena of violent struggle…but they ignore the fact that young people are too aware and know how to fight for their ideals without violence. We will pursue a wide scale struggle against monopoly and tyranny by rejecting violence. We are convinced that the future is ours and we will succeed acting with wisdom and rejecting violence because if the oppressed use violence as do the oppressors, there is no difference between them” (his blog, Dec. 12, 2006).

According to Norooz News, Mr. Mehrnahad was first arrested in March/April 2007 for “having written an article on his blog, criticizing the authorities of Sistan and Baluchestan province and calling for their resignation or dismissal.” The date of his release from prison is not known.

At the time of Mehrnahad’s second arrest, his 16-year old brother, Ebrahim, and three other members of the Voice of Justice Young People’s Society were also arrested. They were all released after a few months of detention.

Arrest and detention

Mr. Ya’qub Mehrnahad was arrested at the annual meeting “Questioning Youth, Accountable Authorities” in early May 2007. Some state officials were reportedly present at this meeting. There were various irregularities during his detention. Mr. Mehrnahad was detained for 5 months in various detention centers of the Ministry of Intelligence and had no contact with his family or attorney. He was then transferred to Zahedan’s central prison where he was held for another two months. His first visit with his family probably took place in this prison, 5 months after his arrest. He was tried on December 25, 2007. Instead of receiving his sentence, expected 10 days after the trial, he was returned to the detention center of the Ministry of Intelligence to be interrogated again; he was again denied visits. (AUTNEWS, Feb 11, 2008).

On February 19, 2008, “Ya’qub Mehrnahad’s family was allowed to visit him for 10 minutes after 50 days [of not having any visits] (AUTNEWS, Feb. 20, 2008). During visits, Mr. Mehrnahad stated that he was pressurized to confess to the alleged charges. His family noticed that he had been tortured; he had lost a lot of weight and was unable to keep his balance (AI, Feb. 12, 2008). In one of the visits, they were warned against speaking Baluchi; they had to speak in Farsi (AI, Mar. 12, 2008).

Trial

Mr. Mehrnahad was tried on December 25, 2007 at the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal of Zahedan, without the presence of a jury, his attorney, or his family (AUTNEWS, Aug. 5, 2008). Amnesty International stated that it was an “unfair trial conducted behind closed doors” (AI, Feb. 12, 2008).

Charges

Mr. Ya’qub Mehrnahad was charged with “membership in and cooperation with the terrorist group of Jondallah” (ISNA).

Jondallah is an armed group calling for the respect of the rights of the Baluchi people, who make up 1-3 percent of the Iranian population and who are mostly Sunni Muslims. Jondallah has carried out a number of armed attacks against Iranian officials and has sometimes taken hostages and killed them. Iranian officials have accused its members of drug trafficking and many have reportedly been executed as such (AI, Feb 12, 2008).

The validity of the criminal charges brought against this defendant cannot be ascertained in the absence of the basic guarantees of a fair trial. International human rights organizations have drawn attention to reports indicating that the Islamic Republic’s authorities have brought trumped-up charges against their political opponents and executed them for drug trafficking, sexual, and other criminal offences. The exact number of people convicted based on trumped-up charges is unknown.

Evidence of guilt

No information is available concerning the evidence presented against the accused.

Defense

Mr. Mehrnahad was tried without the presence of his attorney. During a visit with his family, he reported to be under pressure to confess. He had stressed that “the objective of such pressures were to cover up the truth and the fact that he was prosecuted for his civil activities” (AUTNEWS, Aug. 5, 2008).

A Summary of the Defects of Mr. Ya’qub Mehrnahad’s Legal Proceedings

Analysis of the little legal information that exists in the late Ya’qub Mehrnahad’s case indicates that during the entire adjudication process, judicial and security authorities carried out significant illegal acts that also constituted breaches of human rights principles, thus rendering the death sentence issued in his case unjust. In addition to breaches of international human rights principles, a significant number of Iran’s domestic laws and regulations have also been disregarded. We will analyze these instances herein.

Based on existing official publications, Iranian judicial authorities charged Ya’qub Mehrnahad with cooperation with armed groups opposed to the Iranian regime, and with Moharebeh, whereas all the evidence shows that his activities were peaceful. He had started a society called “Sedaye Edalat” (“Voice of Justice”), which had been established with an official permit issued by the National Youth Organization. The legality of this society clearly shows that the late Mr. Mehrnahad’s activities within that framework were of a completely civil and peaceful nature and within the confines of Iranian laws. He was also the director of the Mardom Salari newspaper in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, which operated with a legal [and official] permit and had no military or armed agenda. He was also a blogger; this too was well within the framework of Iranian laws and regulations. A cursory look at his writings clearly shows that his objective was to raise awareness in the people of Baluchestan and to try to end their hardship, as well as end discriminatory policies in the region. There is not the slightest indication of advocating violence in any of his writings and speeches. To charge him with the crime of Moharebeh, therefore, had no legal basis, since the basic element of Moharebeh is armed action against the regime. At the time the sentence was issued in his case, Articles 186 and 187 of the old Islamic Penal Code [a code which has since been replaced] were the two provisions defining the crime of Moharebeh and Efsad fel-Arz, and Iranian judicial authorities condemned the late Mr. Mehrnahad to death on that basis. According to Article 186 “Members and supporters of any group or organization of people that raises arms against the Islamic regime, who are aware of the group or people or organization’s position, and conduct effective activities and efforts to advance its objectives, shall be Mohareb, so long as [the group or organization’s] core remains [intact], even though they have not participated in the military wing thereof.” Article 187 provides: “Any person or group that plans to overthrow the Islamic regime and obtains arms and explosives for that purpose, as well as persons who knowingly and willfully provide them with effective financial means and/or equipment and/or weapons, shall be Mohareb and Mofsed fel-Arz.” As can clearly be seen from these provisions, the crime of Moharebeh can be established only if an individual is a member of a group that is engaged in armed activities against the regime, or where the individual has raised arms in order to overthrow the regime, whereas all of the late Mr. Mehrnahad’s activities were civil and peaceful. Regarding certain judicial authorities’ claims of Mr. Mehrnahad’s connection to the Jondollah Group, it must be noted that, first, no evidence whatsoever to that effect has thus far been presented, and secondly, assuming that such a connection exists, it does not prove the crime of Moharebeh, since connection with an armed group cannot be considered cooperation with said group.Given the above, Iranian judicial authorities have disregarded existing Iranian law and have wrongly convicted Mr. Mehrnahad of the crime of Moharebeh and Efsad fel-Arz.
Based on published reliable news, the late Mr. Mehrnahad was deprived of his right to an attorney, at least in many stages of the case. Pursuant to Iranian law, a defendant can have access to and benefit from the services of an attorney at all stages of the legal process, whereas Mr. Mehrnahad was absolutely forbidden to have an attorney during his time in the security detention center, and had limited access [at the investigation stage] at the prosecutor’s office, as well as in the courtroom at the trial stage. Based on existing reliable information, his trial was conducted without an attorney, which was completely against the law, since presence of an attorney for the purpose of defending the accused is mandatory for the crime of Moharebeh and Efsad fel-Arz. Pursuant to the Revolutionary and General Courts Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 186, Note 1, “In the event that a defendant accused of crimes where the punishment is, by law, Qesas, execution, stoning, and life imprisonment, does not personally retain and introduce an attorney, the court shall appoint one for the defendant.” Therefore, as can be seen, where the crime consists of Moharebeh, which carries a death sentence, the presence of an attorney is mandatory, so much so that legislation has provided for a court-appointed lawyer in the event that the defendant does not retain one. Violation of this provision will undoubtedly render the trial and the court decision invalid. In the late Mr. Mehrnahad’s case, the court has conducted the trial and issued a sentence in violation of the legal requirement of the accused’s attorney presenting a defense on his behalf. The court’s action was illegal and its decision, regardless of its substance, is therefore utterly defective and without validity.
In the course of a short visit with his family, the late Mr. Mehrnahad expressly and clearly stated that he had been forced to make a confession and admission [of guilt] under duress and torture, whereas under Iranian, duress and torture are illegal and considered a crime. Any admission and/or confession thus obtained is also illegal and without any validity. Principle 38 of the Iranian Constitution as well as other Iranian laws and international documents to which Iran is a signatory, have expressly alluded to that rule, going so far as to define obtaining an admission through torture as a crime, and people who perpetrate the same as criminals. Therefore, not only was security agents torture of the late Mr. Mehrnahad against the law, so was the court’s reliance on the admission obtained under duress and torture.
Pursuant to Iranian law, including the Islamic Penal Code and the Revolutionary and General Courts Rules of Criminal Procedure, admissions and confessions are valid and effective only if made before the judge issuing the decision in the particular case, especially in serious crimes. Therefore, confessions made to the investigating judge and/or law enforcement agents cannot constitute the basis of a judge’s decision. The Revolutionary and General Courts Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 59, Note 1, provides: “In cases where the defendant’s confession, a witness’ testimony and/or testimony to a witness’ testimony constitute the basis for the court’s decision, the judge making the decision in the case must personally hear [such confession and/or testimony].” Therefore, even assuming that the late Mr. Mehrnahad had confessed to the crime to the security forces, since the charge against him was commission of a serious crime, it was absolutely necessary that the court question him de novo, and ascertain the validity of the [previous] confession. Violation of the law renders the decision issued by [the city of] Zahedan Revolutionary Court invalid.
Ya’qub Mehrnahad was deprived to a great extent of visitation with his family, whereas, according to the Prisons Organization’s Rules of Procedure, visitation is a prisoner’s right and judicial authorities cannot deprive him/her of the right to visitation without a valid legal reason. Not only is such deprivation a breach of the prisoner’s right, but in this particular case, the result was that Mr. Mehrnahad’s family had no information about his physical condition and his legal status; this was most certainly significant in intensifying the torture and in the unjust and secretive nature of the adjudication of his case.
The Zahedan Revolutionary Court conducted a closed and secretive trial in the case of Ya’qub Mehrnahad’s. Pursuant to Iranian law, the rule is to conduct trials in public and there must be a valid legal reason to justify conducting a closed door trial. The result of Mr. Mehrnahad’s closed trial was that the judge was able to easily carry out his illegal acts with peace of mind and without fear of public scrutiny. In other words, the closed door nature of the trial exposes the injustice in the late Mr. Mehrnahad’s case more than ever.
After the Revolutionary Court’s ruling, his family intended to retain a lawyer to represent him. Information Ministry agents, however, prevented them from doing so by way of ruse and threats, whereas no authority can prohibit an individual from carrying out lawful activities for the benefit of his/her case, including retaining a lawyer.
The late Mr. Mehrnahad’s appeal of the Revolutionary Court’s decision to the Supreme Court, within the short allotted 20-day period, was not accepted and the Revolutionary Court’s ruling was upheld, which begs the following question: In a system where the appeal process takes months and even years, why was it that in as important and heavily charged a case as Mr. Mehrnahad’s, the authorities acted so swiftly and expeditiously? Is it at all possible to read, analyze, and render a decision in such a case in 20 days, some of which were certainly spent sending the case from Zahedan to Tehran and performing administrative formalities? This hasty move by judicial authorities was a complete violation of existing legal procedure in Iran and is indicative of their will to execute Ya’qub Mehrnahad.

In conclusion, the late Mr. Mehrnahad’s execution was carried out outside the legal framework and in violation of the laws. It seems that in so doing, Iranian authorities were looking at the case from a security and political perspective. The above clearly indicates that the principles of fair trial were not observed in Mr. Mehrnahad’s case and that his execution was done hastily and in violation of the law.

Judgment

The Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal of Zahedan found Ya’qub Mehrnahad guilty of “being at war with God and corruption on earth through cooperation and membership in the terrorist group of Jondallah” and sentenced him to death. The verdict was delivered to his family on February 7, 2008. On February 11, the spokesperson of the Judiciary stated that Mr. Mehrnahad could appeal this verdict (AUTNEWS, Feb. 20, 2008). The appeal was scheduled on 17 February though, by law, defendants have a minimum of 20 days to prepare their appeal. (AI, Feb 12, 2008).

Based on the available information, the authorities pressured and intimidated Mr. Mehrnahad’s family when they attempted to contact attorneys in Tehran and publicize the case in the media. They promised his family that the sentence would be commuted (AUTNEWS, Aug. 5, 2008)

The Supreme Court approved the death sentence, however. Mr. Ya’qub Mehrnahad was hanged, along with another individual named Abdonnaser Taheri Sadr, in Zahedan’s central prison on August 4, 2008.

Abdorrahman Boroumand Center

for Human Rights in Iran

Ya'qub Mehrnahad

About

Case